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THE LADY WHOM A SUPREME COURT CALLED "A
NAKED PROSTITUTE"
By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver Bar
N Updegraph v. Com., 11 S. V R. 394, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania declared that "every debating club" per-
mitting free speech on theological subjects "might dedi-
cate the club-room to the worship of the Goddess of Reason,
and adore the deity in the person of a naked prostitute."
In the light of the phraseology used and the stories then
current of the French Revolution of 1789, it is certain that
the court was alluding to the leading lady in the Festival of
Reason conducted in the cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris
on November 10, 1793. The festival was the result of the
"Worship of Reason" instituted by the Convention a few
days earlier, but the ceremony had no "Goddess of Reason."
There was an impersonation of the "Goddess of Liberty."
The court's choice of words was the result of some tales orig-
inating with enemies of the French Revolution, and not to be
found in Carlyle's French Revolution. There is an old history
by Thomas Henry Dyer, LL.D., and it contains this state-
ment:
"* * * a prostitute, dressed up as the Goddess of Liberty,
came forth from the temple."
The lady was not "a naked prostitute" as the American court
implied, nor even one "dressed up" as Mr. Dyer wrote.
Consult the modern historians: Henri Martin in History
of France, writes:
'Reason, represented by Mademoiselle Maillard, a famous singer,
** * She wore a white robe and sky-blue mantle, * * *."
Gottschalk, American writer on French history, uses
these words:
"Reason-impersonated, some say. by a street-walker, but more
probably, by the wife of Hebert's right-hand man, Momaro-was en-
throned in the temple."
The last quotation is evidence that "some" have said,
and even now "some say" that the First Lady on the historic
occasion was "a street-walker." If any one was ever so sure
of the identity of the lady to know that she was "a naked
prostitute," as the American court intimates, why the dis-
agreement among the historians as to whether she was
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Mademoiselle Maillard or Mme. Momaro? If it was one or
the other of these two, she was neither a "naked" nor a
"dressed up" courtesan, being too busy in respectable ways,
one "a famous singer," and the other the wife of an active
politician. Without naming the lady, James Harvey Robin-
son refers to her as "a handsome actress," Philip Van Ness
Myers says she was "a celebrated beauty," Charles Downer
Hazen describes her as "a dancer from the opera," and James
Edward Gillespie says she was an "opera singer." Carlyle
simply refers to the "Goddess Candeille."
One lone late historian does asperse the character of the
lady in question. He is William Stearns Davis, and in Europe
Since Waterloo (1926) uses this language:
"* * * in 1793 a light woman had been encouraged as she
screamed a ribald song from the high altar of Notre Dame in Paris."
That statement aroused the indignation of Bishop William
Montgomery Brown, a scholar whom the late federal judge
Martin J. Wade characterized as "mentally defective" (58
Am. Law Rev.). The bishop was relying on the scholarship
of Prof. Aulard, as do others, regarded as compos mentis.
No woman appeared on "the high altar." In the ceremony,
an improvised "temple" was used, as Dr. Dyer indicated. The
results of the researches made by Prof. Aulard, the most re-
liable French historian, show that there was no "light wo-
man," either in the temple or on an altar. No "ribald song"
was "screamed" or otherwise delivered. There was sung or
chanted an Ode to Liberty. It is quoted by Winifred Stephens
in her book, "Women of the French Revolution," and con-
tains nothing "ribald."
The mentally sound judge of the Pennsylvania court
apparently never paused to speculate why any common prosti-
tute, disfigured by her calling, would be selected for signal
honors in a public ceremony when, as Miss Stephens observes,
many beautiful actresses and singers of respectability were
available and willing to participate in festivals not only in
Paris but elsewhere in France. Neither did the same judge
reflect on the psychological impossibility among the Rational-
ists of 1789 of making a "deity" of an individual, to say
nothing of adoring "the deity in the person of a naked prosti-
tute." A greater offender than the jurist was, of course, the
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person who invented the tale which later was given credence
by Dr. Dyer, already quoted, and by the court, also quoted.
The man who knew all about the Festival of November
10, 1793, was Jacques Rene Hebert, the French New Dealer
who described it in his newspaper, and who induced the Con-
vention to adopt the "Worship of Reason." On March 24,
1794, his head was chopped off at the instigation of Robes-
pierre. They had "purges" in those days, and possibly some
Huey Long was liquidated by a private assassin. Hebert did
not live to refute false tales about the Feast of Reason. His
co-worker was Pierre Gaspard Chaumette, but the latter, too,
was early executed. The Encyclopedia Brittanica says that
he was a "social reformer" who secured "the suppression of
houses of ill-fame and of obscene literature." He would
naturally prefer some Caesar's wife to take the highest honors
at a public ceremony sponsored by himself. It is possible that
the spouse of Momaro, as Gottschalk suggests, was chosen.
Now, if any lawyer in Pennsylvania or elsewhere wishes
to request the Pennsylvania court to strike from its files, at
least figuratively, the words "a naked prostitute," as being
false, scandalous and defamatory, and as libelously reflecting
on Miss Maillard or Mrs. Momaro, this paper indicates that
material for a supporting brief is accessible.
PRICE-FIXING UNDER INTERSTATE COMMERCE POWER
Federal price-fixing, at least in the case of milk, has been upheld
by a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court
did not enter upon a discussion of the vast constitutional principles
involved, or of the immeasurable economic and political consequences
to be envisaged (vide supra, pp. 125-128, 129-130, 133-134), but
merely concluded that, "The power enjoyed by the states to regulate
the prices for handling and selling commodities within their internal
commerce rests with the Congress in the commerce between the states."
Thus, since a state may regulate the price of milk sold within its borders
(Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S,. 502), it follows that the Federal
Government may regulate the price of milk sold across state lines.
(United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., et at., U. S. Sup.
Ct., June 5, 1939.) Justices Black and Douglas even went so far as
to assert in a separate memorandum that the federal power to enact the
statute did not depend upon the use and nature of milk. (Lawyer Ser-
ice Letter, N. Y. S., Bar Association, June 7, 1939.)
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